The Nasr could carry 'nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy' and was a 'quick response system' that addressed the need to 'deter evolving threats'. The most significant part of the plan was the April 2011 test-firing of the Nasr short range ballistic missile, which Pakistan claimed "added deterrence value to its strategic weapon's programme at short ranges". "They fielded tactical nuclear weapons to blunt any possible Indian military advance," says a senior army official.
Pakistani military planners worked hard to counter the Indian Army's Cold Start military doctrine that called for swift military thrusts into Pakistan.
Post the 26/11 attacks, when its key strategic asset, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, was designated a global terrorist organisation and even the prospect of strategic nuclear weapons did not seem likely to deter a military strike by India, this strategy was retooled. A tactical strike by terrorists that had strategic ramifications, the equivalent of the tripwire on a minefield which sets off a chain reaction. While the Pathankot air base attack, in which seven security personnel were killed, ruptured peace talks between India and Pakistan, the Uri attack invited an Indian military response. Both sensational attacks this year were on military targets-the Pathankot air base in Punjab where four Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorists struck on January 1 and the army base in Uri which the four JeM terrorists attacked on September 18, killing 19 soldiers. In recent months, Pakistan-based terrorists have got lucky twice.
We have to accord all of them equal priority to defeat a terror attack," a senior army official says.Īs the counter-terrorist adage goes: a terrorist only has to get lucky once. "There are literally thousands of targets in Jammu and Kashmir?it doesn't matter if it is an administrative area or headquarters, a supply station or a company operating base.
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